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Abstract
In this paper I analyze post-contractual disputes in the newly privatized elec-
tricity sector in Chile. I discuss the presumption that opportunistic behavior and
disputes arise due to inadequate market design, ambiguous regulation, and insti-
tutional weaknesses. I also assess the presumption that a large number of legal
(public) disputes are inhibited by the nonexistence of institutions able to verify
and enforce contracts. An in-depth analysis of 6 cases of open con‡ict provides
support to such presumptions and highlights the crucial role of an adequate (pre-
privatization) market design. In addition, it concludes that the reduced number of
open con‡icts observed in Chile is probably due to institutional weaknesses, which
induces the parties to use private con‡ict resolution mechanisms.
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21. Introduction
Privatization is, perhaps, the best instrument to induce e¢cient production and resource
allocation when there exists enough market competition. Under this presumption, sev-
eral Latin American countries undertook a rapid privatization process of public utility
industries during the 90’s.1 Much attention was given to privatization and liberalization
processes, but little attention was given to regulatory and institutional reforms, and the
resulting market structure. Privatization relied on strict regulation of those segments
in the market with natural monopoly characteristics, while liberalizing vertically related
markets. Consequently, opportunistic behavior and a number of post-privatization dis-
putes arose due to inadequate market design, ambiguous regulation, and institutional
weaknesses. These con‡icts give rise to three questions: Can the costs of an inadequate
or unsuitable regulatory design outweigh the bene…ts of privatization?2 To what extent
can the market structure and/or the regulatory framework be modi…ed to inhibit ac-
tual practices hampering the market e¢ciency? What would happen if judiciary and
regulatory institutions were able to enforce or interpret complex contracts?
This paper is an attempt to answer these questions through analyzing a number of
issues which might have played a crucial role in inducing or inhibiting disputes in the
newly privatized electricity industry in Chile.3 I have chosen this sector because of the
fact that its privatization was to a large extent …nished in Chile a decade ago. Thus, it
gives us enough time span to be able to observe at full length the evolution of disputes.4
From a theoretical perspective, post-privatization renegotiations and disputes may
arise in equilibrium when contracts governing the relationship between regulators and
…rms are incomplete and/or there are no institutions to enforce them. Thus, we should
observe opportunistic behavior whenever contracting problems are present. However,
legal disputes are not always present even when contracts are incomplete, as I will show
in the case of Chile. One explanation for unobservable open con‡icts comes from the
assumption that courts are absolutely unable to deliver justice, so that the parties never
1See Paredes, et. al. (1995), Schmalensee (1995), and Gilbert and Khan (1996) for a general discussion
about the experience of the newly privatized utilities in these countries.
2Formal treatment and further references on the trade-o¤ between public and private ownership can
be found in Shapiro and Willig (1990), La¤ont and Tirole (1991), and Schmidt (1996). An application
to vertically integrated monopolies is discussed in Saavedra (1999). Bhaskar (1993) presents a survey of
theoretical and empirical issues relating to privatization in developing countries.
3The same concern is further studied in Saavedra and Soto (1999). Basañes, Uribe, and Willig (1998)
uses the same approach when studying post-contractual disputes in several Latin American countries
and Artana, Navajas, and Urbiztondo (1998) provides an excellent revision of several post-contractual
renegotiations in Argentina.
4Bitran and Saavedra (1993), Morandé and Sánchez (1992), and Muñoz (1993) illustrate the regu-
latory pitfalls in the Chilean electricity sector. Paredes (1995), Spiller and Viana (1996), and Morandé
and Rainieri (1997) argue, on the contrary, that the regulatory reform was to a large extent adequately
done in Chile.
3engage in disputes (Hart and Moore, 1988). This assumption is not entirely convincing,
however, because in practice judges do deliver, however partially, and so legal disputes
might be worthwhile. A better explanation is that private settlements may occur in
equilibrium following pretrial negotiations, which are not necessarily observed by third
parties (Spier, 1992, and Skaperdas, 1992).
The qualitative analysis of observed legal disputes after privatization may shed some
light on both the size of the problems related to the Chilean electricity sector and the
consequent public policies necessary to improve its e¢ciency. In this paper I am primarily
concerned with post-contractual disputes directly or indirectly arising from the privati-
zation process. It, thus, comprises disputes between regulators and …rms, among …rms
as long as they are the result of contracts in privatization periods or lack thereof, and
between the antitrust commission (representing consumers) and …rms currently working
in the industry or potentially interested in participating.5
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the second section, I start with a brief
description of the structure of Chile’s electricity sector with regard to production and
consumption areas – in particular, its geographical structure – as well as to the regulatory
framework and political economy issues arising from privatization. I think these elements
are crucial in determining the manner in which the market works and, consequently, the
likelihood of observing post-contractual disputes. In section three, I present six cases of
open disputes in the electricity sector in Chile. Based on previous sections, in the fourth
section of the paperI include a critical assessment of howmarket structure, regulation and
institutional framework had helped to generate or inhibit disputes. Finally, I conclude
the analysis in section …ve.
2. Brief Description of the Electricity Sector in Chile
This section describes the main characteristics of the Chilean electricity sector from the
point of view of how its structure, development, and regulation might have inhibited or
induced disputes.
Notwithstanding limitations described below, the market seems to be, in spirit, ade-
quately designed. The law provides institutions that smooth the working of the market
(e.g. it considers institutions designed to coordinate daily operations and guarantee the
quality of service); considers mechanismsto generate information in time and forall users,
inducing transparency in transactions and easy monitoring by the authorities; and, …-
nally, whenever disputes appear, the law establishes con‡ict-resolution mechanisms and
provides for an ordered manner to deal with them.
5As such, we dismiss disputesarising from thenormal operation of an industry, which I call commercial
disputes, which bear no connection to privatization processes.
42.1. Sources of Con‡ict from Geographic Country Characteristics
Chile is a very long but narrow country (3,700 miles long and an average width of 120
miles), located alongside the Andes mountain range. The climate is quite heterogeneous.
The northern half of the country mostly comprises one of the driest desserts in the world
(the Atacama dessert), with zero rain fall in most areas. The south, on the contrary, is
characterized by abundant rain and snow accumulation. The weather is erratic, however,
and annual rainfall tends to have wide ‡uctuations. Figure 2.1 summarizes the main
characteristics of the electricity sector in Chile.
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This geographical situation con…gures a peculiar situation for the electricity industry
and suggests several areas of potential con‡ict.
First, the Andes mountain range provides advantages to hydroelectric power gener-
ation in the center and south where water dams are relatively easy to build. On the
contrary, gas and thermoelectric generation are the only viable alternative in the north.
In addition, while thermoelectric supply is in broad lines deterministic, hydroelectric
supply is random as it faces hydrological risks. Since thermoelectric and hydroelectric
generator companies compete with very di¤erent operating costs in the SIC, it is in-
escapable that pro…tability will depend heavily on strategic actions undertaken by these
5two types of …rms producing in several areas of potential con‡ict. This would lead to
con‡icts between operators that a¤ect the performance of the whole industry, such as
the management of water reserves by hydroelectric companies, the allocation of technical
risk among …rms, the calculation of marginal and operation costs, the order in which
each …rm’s supply is dispatched to consumers, and the terms and structure of contracts
among …rms. These issues are discussed in detail in sections 3.2, 3.5, and 3.6.
Second, the distribution and composition of demand also has conditioned the evolu-
tion of the sector. As shown in Figure 2.1, there are two main and independent electric
systems: the Grand North Integrated System (SING) and the Central Integrated System
(SIC). Each system comprises its own generation plants, transmission lines, and distri-
bution networks. An important element that characterizes both systems is the rapid
expansion of demand in them. In the SIC, energy consumption expanded at 7% per year
on average in the 1989-1996 period. For the next decade, it is expected that demand will
increase between 7% and 8% per year. In the SING, rapidly expanding mining operations
has increased demand by 15% in the last three years, and it is expected to continue at
similar rates for the next …ve years. As demand expands, business opportunities provides
incentive for aggressive behavior among …rms and con‡ict is likely to appear, in particular
when regulation does not adjust quickly enough to changes in the industry structure.
Third, since the country is narrow it is not feasible to build a network of transmission
lines, so a unique high-voltage transmission line is the only economically viable structure
(Bernstein, 1988, and Phillipi, 1991).6 Consequently, the reform of the electricity sector
was based on the notion that this con…gures a “natural” monopoly for transmission.
Potential con‡icts may arise in the SIC because of the vertically integrated industry
resulting after privatization, as explained in the next section. This issue is analyzed in
the Colbún’s new transmission line case in section 3.3.
2.2. Sources of Con‡ict derived from Privatization
The electricity sector in Chile was traditionally dominated by state-owned enterprises
at the generation, transmission, and distribution levels. The structure of the industry
changed markedly after the coup d’ etat of 1973. Privatization was carried out accord-
ing to the notion that electricity generation and large-size consumers were potentially
competitive markets, while distribution and transmission were considered as local and
natural monopolies, respectively (geographical considerations tend to support this no-
6Decreasing average costs are out of discussion here. Competition may be feasible in this context,
however, if there exists a network transmission line with diversi…ed ownership, thereby reducing the
transmitter’s monopsony power. Ordover, Pittman, and Clyde (1993) presents an application of this
potential competition to European railways.
6tion as discussed above).7 Accordingly, (partial) separation of the di¤erent productive
stages started in 1981 by requiring Chilectra to dismember into one generation company
(Chilgener) and two distribution companies (Chilquinta, in Valparaíso, and Chilectra, in
Santiago). Endesa, on the other hand, was separated into …ve independent distribution
companies, three generating complexes (Endesa, Pullinque, and Pilmaiquén), and three
independent integrated systems Edelnor (in the north of the country) and Edelaysén and
Edelmag (in the extreme south).8
The Issue of Vertical Integration9 One of the criticisms arises from the structure
of ownership that emerged from privatization, which is characterized by an important
degree of vertical integration. Although the state monopoly was broken into di¤erent
companies prior to its divestiture, Endesa was privatized with a dominant position in
the SIC (see Table N± 1). Lack of due restrictions to ownership across segments of the
industry, in addition, permitted Endesa to keep its virtual monopoly in high-voltage
transmission. Moreover, privatization of distribution companies resulted in Enersis – the
controller of Endesa – holding 74 percent of the shares in the main distribution company,
Chilectra.
This vertically integrated structure has been the source of a large number of disputes
and con‡icts. Democratic administrations have claimed repeatedly that Endesa’s domi-
nant role in generation and transmission does not allow for fair competition in the sector.
Two large-scale lawsuits – described in detail in section 3.1 – are the main disputes in
this regard.
A second line of criticism arises from the fact that divestiture led to the creation of
several classes of shares with di¤erent decision-making power. For example, few prefer-
ential shares allow control of Endesa and its ancillaries. During most of the 90’s, Enersis
controlled Endesa with only 25% of shares.10
7Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994), Frankena and Owen (1994), Newbery (1996), and Vickers
and Yarrow (1987) provide economic support to these considerations. That is, generation, transmission,
and distribution are essentially di¤erent activities, with di¤erent features, such as technologies (scale and
scope economies), demand (size and power of customers), competitiveness (e.g. feasibility of Yardstick
competition), etc. Some authors include another segment of the market: supply to …nal consumers.
8The latter two systems are being scheduled for privatization as integrated monopolies (because of
the small size of their markets). The other …rms are all now privatized.
9These claims against of the market structure resulting from privatization have been raised by Bitran
and Saavedra (1993), Blanlot (1993), and Sáez (1993). Theoretical sustain of informational advantages
hampering competition can be reached on Tirole (1988), chapters 8 and 9. Vickers (1996) discusses these
issues from contracts perspective. Regarding the feasibility of …rst-mover advantages, see Gal-Or (1992)
and Bagwell (1995).
10Preferential shares were created with the purpose of increasing incentives for e¢cient management
(Grossman and Hart, 1980). Transaction prices for these shares have been considered by critics of
privatization as being too low since book values were used, as opposed to market values (Marcel, 1989).
7Table N± 1
Market Share in the Main Integrated Systems in 1997 (%)
SIC SING
Generation
Endesa & ancillaries (Enersis holding) 59.2 8.0






Transelec (Enersis holding) 100.0 0.0
Edelnor 0.0 100.0
Distribution
Chilectra –Santiago (Enersis holding) 40.0 -
Chilquinta – Valparaíso 20.0 -
Others 40.0 -
Source: National Energy Commission (CNE)
A third line of criticism arises from the “…rst-move advantage”, since Endesa was
given the sole responsibility for investment plans, which in turn gave her prime infor-
mation on new commercial areas, water rights, reserves management, etc. In this case,
informational advantages would have been used to discriminate or block the entry of
potential competitors. Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 discuss these issues in detail.
Institutional Framework Privatization required important changes in the institu-
tional setup of the market. In 1978 two institutions were created: The National En-
ergy Commission (CNE), a decentralized advisory agency dealing mainly with planning
and regulatory activities of the sector, and the Superintendency of Electricity and Fuels
(SEC), the supervisory agency mainly dealing with quality of the service and safety fa-
cilities. A new legal framework was adopted in 1982, establishing norms applicable to all
the companies in the sector, regardless of ownership. These norms included regulation
of production, transportation, distribution, concessions, easements, prices, quality and
This point is of particular interest because it may signal some elements of corruption in the privatization
process in Chile.
11Currently, Gener S.A., the second major holding in generation.
8safety conditions of facilities, machinery and instruments, and the relationship of the
companies with the State and the private sector.
In 1985, the CDEC – an acronym for Economic Load Dispatching Center – was
created. The CDEC is a coordination unit, responsible of dispatching energy from gen-
eration plants to distributors on the basis of minimum marginal costs. In the short-run,
the CDEC acts as a clearance house in the energy market, while in the long run it is in
charge of planning the operation of the combined generation-transmission system. Only
companies with a minimum generating capacity of 60 MW are allowed to participate in
the CDEC’s Board of Directors. In view of the concentration of property in generation
in the SIC, Endesa and its ancillaries have controlled the CDEC, which has given rise to
a number of disagreements among members, as noted in section 3.6
In addition to the CDEC, the SEC, and the CNE, two other entities play an important
role in the mixed-owned electricity industry: the Antitrust Commission and the Ministry
of the Economy. The Antitrust Commission, as its name suggest, is devoted to preventing
non-competitive behavior in all markets, including the electricity sector. The commission
has an investigative branch (Fiscal Económico) and two independent commissions. The
Preventive Commission is a regional, …rst-instance judiciary body allowed to sanction
non-competitive practices. The national Resolutive Commission is a second-instance
court, also allowed to sanction malpractice. The Supreme Court is the only instance
of appeal for sanctions applied by the Antitrust Commissions. The Ministry of the
Economy has the right to set tari¤s (as proposed by the CNE) and promote the e¢cient
development of the generation, transmission and distribution subsectors. Disputes arising
from inadequate institutional setup are addressed in section 3.6.
2.3. Con‡icts Stemming from the Regulatory Framework
Regulation in the electricity sector is complex both from a technical and economic point
of view. In addition, and as discussed below, in the Chilean case it is incomplete. Both
elements suggest the existence of several areas which are potential sources of contract
renegotiation and disputes.
Node prices Node prices, which correspond to the sum of the basic energy and power
costs (plus a penalty factor), are the basis for most long-term contracts between gen-
erators and distributors. Costs in the SIC are obtained using an optimization model,
which incorporates water supply restrictions and a projection of demand for the next 10
years.12
12The basic energy cost is calculated by weighing medium-term marginal costs at a speci…c point in
the network, forecasted for the next four years of operation. In addition, the basic price of power is
calculated considering a gas-fueled plant according to a formula that includes the cost of investment in
diesel turbines; the cost of investment in transmission lines; the …xed operating and maintenance costs;
9The current electricity law de…nes only the conceptual aspects of determining both
basic energy and power costs. Hence, the determination of node prices allows for several
areas in which disputes could arise. First, prices are determined on the basis of forecasts
of water availability and a security margin. Since Endesa holds most water rights and
manages water reserves, small hydroelectric producers have claimed it has an informa-
tional advantage which hampers competition in generation because of its free access to
the cheapest productive factor: the water. This issue is further elaborated in section 3.5.
Secondly, security margins and other technical issues, on the other hand, are increas-
ingly being disputed by thermoelectric …rms as being too bene…cial for hydroelectric
companies, such as Endesa.13 These disputes, though, should not be considered as de-
terminant of the working of the industry, but they do re‡ect the potential damaging role
that information asymmetry could play in the sector. Further details occur in section
3.6.
A side issue, but a crucial one, a¤ecting the work of the industry is that distributors
have the ”legal right” to buy at node prices to serve the regulated market. It is clear that
economic quasi-rents could be obtained by a distributor since it can allocate purchases
at will. Since short-run marginal costs di¤er between thermoelectric and hydroelectric
producers during the year (because of changing levels of water reserves and weather con-
ditions), a distributor could potentially bene…t a particular company by signing contracts
for only part of the year. In the long run, this will produce high-pro…t generators and
low-pro…t generators, and could eventually drive the latter out of the market (see section
3.2).
Regulated Distribution Markets The regulated price, which applies to consumers
with a demand for power below 2MW, is determined by the regulator as a combination
of the node price and a regulated margin, which corresponds to the imputed value-added
of distribution. Distributors pay generators the node price, unless they have signed a
contract specifying otherwise. Since the CDEC coordinates energy dispatch according
to the lowest marginal costs, production is, in fact, separated from whatever commercial
commitments a generating company may have. Consequently, the di¤erences between
commitments and production must be resolved through open market purchases and sales
capital recovery factors; a theoretical power reserve margin of the electricity system; and losses on the
transmission line. Finally, penalty factors correspond to marginal losses of transmission in the system,
and they are determined by considering the distances from every node to the network, as well as the
level of tension of the conductors. See Morandé and Rainieri (1997) for further details.
13For example, the 1997 season was extremely rainy (due to the El Niño Stream phenomenon). Dams,
in several cases, over‡ew and companies were forced to allow the spillover. Since the spillover is a
loss of money, the manner in which …rms’ electricity supply was ordered mattered substantially. Firms
dispatched last were forced to waste more water than …rms dispatched early. Since Endesa holds the
majority in the Board of Directors at the CDEC, it seems possible it used its dominant role to its bene…t.
10at a non-regulated transfer price in the spot bulk market.
Regulated prices are reviewed every four years. As such, it is a pre-announced nego-
tiation, in which strategic behavior is likely. The mechanism, consequently, requires the
government and …rms in the industry to agree on a vector of in‡ation-adjusted prices to
be charged to consumers for a pre-speci…ed number of years. Prices are established such
that an e¢cient …rm obtains a targeted rate of return on assets. Since such an e¢cient
…rm does not exist, a simulation model is used as benchmark (this could be considered
a form of yardstick competition).
In principle and under symmetric information, the mechanism should provide ade-
quate incentives to …rms to reduce costs by forcing them to be more e¢cient than the
simulated optimal …rm. Under asymmetric information, however, this mechanism has
important shortcomings. For example, one unsolved problem is how the regulator ob-
tains the cost structure of the e¢cient …rm. The experience shows that when information
is based on actual market data, simulated costs are strongly in‡uenced by those of the
existing monopoly, so that in practice this tari¤s setting mechanism tends to converge to
the standard “rate of return” model.14
Transmission Tolls Since the Chilean regulation considers high-voltage transmission
a natural monopoly, in order toensure competition in the generation market in the system
(SING, SIC, whatever), the law guarantees open access to transmission lines (easement):
as long as it has excess capacity, the transmission company cannot refuse to serve any
producer interested in dispatching energy to a consumer or to be sell in the spot market,
even if the tari¤ has not been agreed in advance. Regulation, however, is incomplete
in two important areas: transmission tolls and new investments required to expand the
network when necessary. This has been one of the main sources of disputes among private
…rms and we observe its adverse consequences on the society in section 3.3.
The 1982 Electricity Law did not consider clear procedures for setting transmission
charges. It did not represent a problem during the 80’s (Endesa was a state monopoly at
that time). After privatization, however, the lack of de…nition became a problem. The
legal framework was modi…ed in 1990 to establish the price system for the transmission
sector. Although the law was passed and it covered the basic lines along which prices are
to be set, its corresponding Statute (which determines prices in practice) has not been
adopted to date.
When capacity is limited or new transmission lines are necessary, the law presumes
that interested …rms and the transmitter can negotiate an agreement to do the required
investments. To a large extent, the law does not consider the possible asymmetric bar-
14Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994), chapter 6, discusses the convergency e¤ect in the RPI - X
British scheme. Their analysis is perfectly suitable to the Chilean mechanism. Chapter 3 of the same
book summarizes the main drawbaks of the rate of return regulation.
11gaining power of …rms, in particular when the additional demand is not substantial, nor
the possibility of anticompetitive practices by the dominant conglomerate in the market.
3. Six Cases of Open Con‡ict
In this section, I present six cases of open con‡ict, which had either gone through the
judiciary system (Antitrust Commissions, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court)
or through private arbitration processes.15
Even most of those cases have elements of market structure, regulation, and enforce-
ability problems, it is convenient to …gure it out that each of them has a major important
cause. Consequently, I mainly relate the …rst two cases to con‡icts raising from inade-
quate market design of the industry, so that Enersis holding could have used its vertical
integration characteristics in order to hamper competitors. In subsections 3.3 to 3.5 I
describe cases mainly gathered by regulatory failures, such as opportunistic behavior due
to both unsuitable or simply inexistent regulation. Finally, in subsection 3.6 I group
con‡icts stemming from institutional weakness in Chile.
3.1. Vertical Integration Disputes
Vertical integration between Endesa and the only transmitter (Transelec) has been re-
garded by the government as the main potential deterrent to competition. Two major
trials have been initiated, and subsequently lost by the government, in order to divest
this vertically integrated conglomerate. During the …rst trial (1990-1992), the Fiscal
Económico made a case against these …rms based on three elements: (a) participa-
tion of Enersis in generation (Endesa), transmission (Endesa and currently its ancillary
Transelec) and distribution (Chilectra) hampered competition, (b) a set of allegations by
Pullinque of non-competitive behavior from Endesa, and (c) the fact that one represen-
tative of Enersis was elected CEO of Endesa.
The Fiscal Económico argues that Enersis hampered competition using at least two
mechanisms. One was through its control on the CDEC: Pullinque was called to generate
energy many timeswhen operating costs were above node prices; but it wasrarely the case
with Endesa and its ancillaries. The contrary happened when marginal costs were below
15The most publicized case is not presented here, however, because both there are still several related
trials on courts and it is not closely related to the privatization process itself. In August, 1997 Enersis’
comptroller-executives sold its preferential shares to Endesa of Spain using a supposed rather than
cumbersome procedure, called in its moment “the century’s business”. After a couple of months, details
of the procedure became publicly known, revealing that it was not a cumbersome and fair business but
actually “the century’s swindle”. Currently, these former comptroller-executives have been sued by the
Superintendency of Securities (SVS) for illegally using privileged information, having con‡icts of interest,
and hiding relevant information to the regulator. In addition, the State Defense Council recently sued
these executives for producing damage to the society.
12node prices. This practice was considered discriminatory because it raises Endesa’s pro…t
to the cost of Pullinque’s owners. In addition, Endesa was able to technically justify this
strategy by congestion transmission lines on Pullinque’s node during melting periods.
The Resolution Committee of the Antitrust Commission voted in favor of Enersis,
however. The Supreme Court rati…ed the favorable sentence in a split decision. The
Supreme Court’s opinion declared that no evidence of abuse of power or misconduct
accompanied the prosecutor’s claim, and that divesting the holding would limit Enersis’
constitutional rights. The only part of the claim with which the Supreme Court agreed
was the election of an Enersis director as CEO of Endesa which could negatively a¤ect
the necessary transparency and allow for practices aiming at the competitive functioning
of this sector. Nothing in concrete was said, however, in order to solve this problem.
The Fiscal Económico started a new lawsuit against …rms belonging to the Enersis
holding in October, 1992. This trial was kept low pro…le by the government, however,
until 1994. In that year, Enersis acquired 12.5% of Endesa’s shares and became the main
shareholder with 25% of property, thus avoiding any action by the government against its
control of Endesa. Consequently, the Fiscal Económico activate the second major trial
against Enersis.
The Fiscal Económico extended a demand against Endesa and Transelec on the
grounds that vertical integration could potentially hamper economic e¢ciency (“risk”
of non-competitive behavior) through three ways:
² Distributor Chilectra could bene…t Endesa or its ancillaries by issuing preferential
contracts, similar to those used against Pullinque (see above) and Colbún (see the
next case).
² Enersis could use CDEC in order to bene…t Endesa or its ancillaries when deal-
ing with the dispatch of energy from di¤erent generating facilities. The Fiscal
Económico presumed that since Enersis has two of the four directors of the CDEC
and Transelec actually delivers the energy, an integrated …rm could manipulate
dispatch to its bene…t.
² Being Transelec an ancillary of Endesa, the latter obtains inside information from
the former and receives special treatment regarding tolls and other speci…cations
of its rival’s contracts. In addition, Transelec may hold the release of independent
generators consultation, regarding the cost of using the network to serve large
customers, until Endesa or its ancillaries could match the best rival proposal.
The sentence of this second trial, issued in june 1997, favored Enersis again. The
Antitrust Commission considered that the matter had already been judged in the pre-
vious trial, and that the Fiscal Económico did not show any evidence of malpractice by
13Enersis or its ancillaries. In addition, the Antitrust Commission issued a set of “rec-
ommendations” for a better performance of the electricity sector. In some sense, these
recommendations recognize potential anti-competitive practices in this sector that could
be prevented by three changes in the industry. First, the authority should issue as soon
as possible the statute of the sector in order to solve the existent ambiguities with respect
to transmission tolls. Secondly, Transelec should open its property to the participation
of other interested …rms (not done yet). Finally, distribution companies may publicly
auction their purchases of energy and power (not done yet).
There are several elements that should be added to obtain a full characterization of
the trial. First, the Fiscal Económico had a very weak case from an empirical point of
view. In fact, the accusation is presented in terms of fears that Chilectra would grant
preferential contracts to other Enersis …rms and fears that there could be con‡icts of
interest within the CDEC derived from …rms being part of the holding Enersis. He o¤ered
nocharacterization of howthese practicescould be implemented orwhat typesof behavior
would be consistent with these fears.
Second, it is apparent that the trial was ill-directed on the part of the prosecution.
This could be observed in its reliance on legal arguments, disregarding economic facts.
In addition, the prosecutor failed to convince the judges of the need to look at conditions
which could allow for non-competitive behavior instead of documented proofs of such
behavior.
Finally, it is conspicuous that other potential bene…ciaries of a de-concentration of
Enersis which have had problems with Enersis before (such as Chilgener, Colbún, etc.)
were not considered as witness of the accusation during the trial. It could be that either
they feared retaliation from Enersis, preferred to maintain a low pro…le for strategic
purposes, or there was no evidence of misconduct.
3.2. Market Discrimination: Colbún against Chilectra, Endesa, and Pehuenche
(Enersis holding).
The most important dispute in market discrimination occurred in 1992, when Colbún
charged Chilectra, Endesa, and Pehuenche for discrimination and predatory practices. A
poorly designed contract facilitated Chilectra’s discrimination against Colbún and, since
the strategy favored Chilectra’srelated generatorPehuenche and increased Colbún’slong-
run marginal costs, this strategy was also considered predatory.
This con‡ict started as a dispute in the CDEC and, following the standard procedure,
the Minister of the Economy acted as judge in the case. When he sanctioned in favor of
Colbún, Enersistook thecase tothe Antitrust Commission on thegrounds that the Minis-
ter of the Economy was not competent to sanction the matter. The dispute was analyzed
by the Resolution Commission during 1992 without reaching a judgement. In Septem-
ber, 1992 Enersis signed an agreement to compensate Colbún for losses and accepted to
14modify contracts. Chilectra and Colbún signed a long-term contract (1992-2001) with
similar characteristics of those signed by other suppliers (Endesa and Chilgener).
The source of the dispute in this case stemmed from a 1989 agreement signed by
all members of the CDEC regarding prorates in sales to distributors, a poorly designed
contract between Chilectra and Colbún, and the disturbing role played by the appearance
of a new operator in the generation market.
According to the 1989 clause, at each point in time Chilectra had to buy energy from
producers, at node prices, according to each generating …rm’s “load factor”, that is, in
relation to the power-energy ratio of the client. This clause was imposed in order to
avoid non-competitive practices on the part of Chilectra and in favor of other members
of the vertically integrated conglomerate (Endesa). Colbún, at the same time, had signed
a contract to supply Chilectra on the basis of ful…lling Chilectra’s needs whenever other
suppliers(Endesaand Chilgener) could not meetdemand. Thisleft Colbún astheresidual
supplier in the market.
In 1991, Pehuenche – an Endesa ancillary – started operations and began to sell
energy to Chilectra without compliance of the 1989 agreement. Chilectra interpreted the
1989 agreement as binding only for members of the CDEC at the time (that is, Endesa,
Chilgener, and Colbún) but not for new members, such as Pehuenche. In practical terms,
the load factor for Pehuenche was variable and ranged between 0% and 79%.
In 1992 Colbún complained that non-compliance with the 1989 agreement by Pe-
huenche was detrimental. The reason was that, being the residual supplier, Colbún was
required to provide vast amounts of energy only when marginal costs were above node
prices, and very little quantity during the rest of the year. This strategy left Pehuenche
better o¤ (selling at node prices above marginal costs) at the cost of Colbún (selling
below marginal costs), while Endesa and Chilectra were left indi¤erent.
Several elements make discrimination feasible.
² The contract signed by Colbún and Chilectra was clearly incomplete. The fact that
Colbún was the residual supplier of Chilectra was not a problem under compliance
of the 1989 agreement, but an unforeseen contingency proved the contract to be
detrimental to Colbún. Colbún’s strategy was clearly shortsighted, given that Pe-
huenche’s facilities were under construction, and it could be fully anticipated that
Pehuenche was going to be a major supplier in the market.16
² Since Chilectra, Endesa, and Pehuenche belong to the same holding, Enersis, it
facilitates coordination among …rms to discriminate.
16There are political economy elements here, however. Colbún’s main executives who signed such
contract in 1989 were appointed by the military government, so that they knew they were stopping
working in Colbún in March, 1990.
15² With Chilectra’s approval, Endesa gave Pehuenche the right to sell to Chilectra 190
MW out of almost 500 MW of power contracted between Endesa and Chilectra at
that time. Chilectra and Pehuenche made a private contract considering a ‡exible
supply of energy. This allows Pehuenche to use the above mentioned strategy
to pro…t during snow melting periods, to the detriment of the residual supplier,
Colbún.
These three elementswere the basisof Colbún’saccusation against Enersis fordiscrim-
inatory and predatory behavior. As mentioned by Blanlot (1993), the long-run condition
that marginal costs should equate node prices was not met.
Several authors favored Colbún’s position (Bitran and Saavedra, 1993, Blanlot, 1993,
and Morandé and Sánchez, 1992) and remarked that crucial factors facilitating discrim-
inatory practices were the existence of a vertically integrated holding in the market and
the existence of an incomplete (ambiguous) regulation in the electric industry in Chile.
The wrong assumption in the regulatory framework about the non-existence of integrated
…rms in the sector and the presumption of competition in generation make discrimination
practices feasible. Otherwise, since Chilectra always purchases energy at node prices, why
it would discriminate in favor of Pehuenche?
Discrimination was pro…table to Enersis because Pehuenche’s pro…ts – derived from
its sales to Chilectra – were larger than non-realized pro…ts by Endesa (due to its vol-
untary reduction in sales). This highlights the importance to Endesa of maintaining not
only the control of Pehuenche but also a large share in its property (93%). Since Chilec-
tra’s stockholders were indi¤erent between accepting or not Endesa’s decision, Enersis’
control over the distributor (Chilectra) was also necessary to discriminate. Clearly, the
discriminatory strategy was pro…table only to those Chilectra’s stockholders belonging
to Enersis.
3.3. Colbún’s Transmission Line Bypassing Transelec’s Monopoly Service in
Transmission
This case illustrates how an incomplete regulation (absence of pricing mechanism for
transmission tolls), and the subsequent uncertainty faced by …rms, induces socially in-
e¢cient decisions that reduces the society’s welfare. That is, despite important scale
economies in the transmission market of the electricity industry, private parties decide
to build two high-voltage transmission lines.
Lack of a proper de…nition of transmission tolls and cost-sharing in expansion in-
vestments have been, perhaps, the most important areas of con‡ict and renegotiation in
the electricity industry in Chile.17 As mentioned, the law guarantees open access to the
17This applies to the SIC. In the SING, most transmission problems are not present because main
customers (such as mines) require transmission lines that have no alternative use (i.e., lines running from
16transmission network as long as capacity allows it. When capacity does not permit an
additional user, investment in the network and its associated costs should be established
freely through negotiations between the user and the owner of the network. The poten-
tial user, therefore, has the choice of connecting with the network of the transmission
company (and avoid undertaking the investments) or, alternately, building the lines to
satisfy its own requirements and connecting with the network at the points it deems most
suitable. An intermediate solution would be to build the lines it needs and connect with
the network only for the use of sections that have surplus capacity.
The law also establishes that the company that owns the facilities should calculate
the value of the toll, the areas of in‡uence, the new replacement value, and how it
should be prorated among …rms. Nevertheless, the transmission company should make
the replacement values and operating costs for all the sections of the system available
to all members of the SIC. A user who does not agree with the toll calculated by the
company has recourse to arbitration.
In 1990, Colbún – then a stated-owned …rm – started to supply energy to Chilectra.
From the beginning, Colbún and Endesa disagreed on transmission tolls and connection
fees. Endesa-Transelec charges Colbún with transmission fees between $ 16 to$ 18 million
a year; Colbún, on the other hand, made annual provisions (tentative payments) for $ 12
to $ 13 million, until the dispute was solved. By the end of 1992, both …rms agreed to call
on an arbitrage commission to settle the matter. However, the commission was unable
to determine what the transmission costs should be and the proportion that Colbún had
to pay.
During 1994, Transelec and Colbún increased their di¤erences regarding the pricing of
transmission tolls. According to a new study on transmission costs developed by Transe-
lec, an annual payment of $ 21 million was consistent with the proportion of energy sent
by Colbún to Santiago. Colbún rejected this proposal on the grounds that it was arbi-
trary, monopolistic, and aimed at increasing the pressure on the arbitrage commission to
solve the dispute concerning unpaid transmission fees. Fearing it could loss the arbitrage
and face further litigation costs, Colbún initiated the analysis of an alternative solution
to its transmission problem, in the form of building its own transmission line to Santi-
ago. A study concluded that the cost of building the line would be $ 70 million, which
represented $ 7.5 million a year in terms of Colbún’s cost of capital. Yearly operation
costs amounted to $ 4 million. Consequently, owning its own transmission lines would
represent, at most, a cost of $ 11.5 million a year.
After Colbún decided to build its private transmission line, Enersis (which owned
Transelec through Endesa) followed two di¤erent strategies. The …rst one was to convince
the network to isolated facilities in the Atacama desert). This makes negotiations very simple: either
the client or the generating company builds the transmission line (whomever is the most e¢cient builder
or it is decided during bargaining). In fact, there are not disputes on this regard.
17Colbún (and the government) that an independent line was an ine¢cient solution, not
only from a social point of view, but also from a strictly private perspective. Accordingly,
at the end of 1995 Transelec o¤ered a transmission fee of only $10.3 million a year.
The second strategy consisted of starting conversations with the government in order
to reduce or eliminate the vertical integration in generation and transmission markets.
Endesa planned to divest Transelec and retain only 30 percent of the shares, while the
rest would be allocated in the stock market to be purchased by institutional investors
and other generating companies.18
Conversations between Enersis and Colbún lasted until January, 1996. Enersis re-
quested that Colbún build only one 500 KVh line (and use existing Transelec facilities as
backup), and later to transfer the line to Transelec as a capital participation. Colbún did
not agree to this scheme, however, and in January 1996 started to build two 220 KVh
transmission lines.
At …rst glance, Colbún’s decision may appear to be politically motivated in an e¤ort
by the government to curtail Enersis’ political and economic power. A closer evaluation
of the project, however, shows that in all likelihood this is not the case. In spite of scale
economies in transporting electricity, Colbún’s annual costs of using its own lines are only
$ 1 million more than under Transelec’s …nal proposal. However, building its own line
gave Colbún the added advantage of avoiding litigation costs. Considering the history of
con‡icts between Enersis’ …rms and Colbún, it does not seem to be a high price to pay for
independence. In addition, building only one transmission line and hiring backup service
from Transelec, whose fees are not regulated, did not assure Colbún that Transelec would
not use its monopoly power in the future to extract rents. This argument was of strategic
importance in 1995 when the government was looking to privatize Colbún. The …rm’s
independence was considered to be crucial in …nding a majority partner.19
Colbún’s transmission lines …nally entered into operation in August 1997.20
3.4. The Tari¤ Setting Case in the Regulated Distribution Market
This case is extremely important in showing us how legal ambiguities produced by a
short-sighted regulator provides the scope for opportunistic behavior that reduces market
e¢ciency.
18An ex-post analysis shows that this was not an Enersis’ credible strategy. Its posterior decision was
not to open Transelec’s property to any other potential partner.
19Colbún cannot sell transmission services to other producers, however, because of Transelec’s legal
monopoly in this segment of the market. If the transmission activity were deregulated in future, this
high voltage lines might be a new business for Colbún.
20Regarding the dispute between Endesa-Transelec and Colbún related to transmission tolls, the par-
ties resolved this con‡ict agreeing that provisions made by Colbún between 1992 and 1996 would cover
unpaid basic tolls. Thus, no extra payment from any …rm was required at the end.
18After …nishing the tari¤s setting process on November 1996, the National Energy
Commission (CNE) announced the new regulated distribution prices in the electricity
sector which would be applicable for the next four years. Tari¤s were between 5.8% and
6.4% lower than the prevailing values. Distribution companies, however, realized that
both a loophole in the law and the asymmetric information in the industry would provide
them quasi-rents. In e¤ect, it was common knowledge that the way in which tari¤s are
…xed in Chile could distort prices, so that they would reject the new regulated prices on
the grounds that they were distorted.21
Immediately after the announcement, three major distribution companies – led by
Chilectra – argued that the new tari¤s scheme was arbitrary and instituted an appeal
before the Court of Appeals (protection demand). The main e¤ect of this appeal, in this
case, was to inhibit the price changes until the court determines whether the CNE had
the authority to install such price adjustment and proceeded according to regulations.
Therefore, as long as the sentence is not given out, all distribution companies are able to
charge prevailing (higher) tari¤s.
In order to signal their agreement with the fact that the electricity distribution was
cheaper than it was four years before, so attempting to a¤ect court’s rule, the three
distribution companies reduced …xed charges between 26% to 42% (Chilectra reduced
charges in 30%). These changes were implemented between November 6 and November
11. A similar reduction was implemented by another …ve minor distribution companies
during the …rst week of December. However, reductions in …xed charges were negligible
when compared with tari¤ reductions imposed by the CNE.
The regulator realized late that distribution companies were able to pro…t by delaying
the tari¤ reduction announced by the CNE. This quasi-rents arise from the absence of
legislation forcing monopolies to return to consumers any extra payments when the courts
determine the need for tari¤ reductions. Accordingly, the government enacted legislation
to close this loophole on December 4. This legislation could only be implemented after
publication in the Diario O…cial (O¢cial Newspaper), which occurred only on December
28, 1996.
On January 31 1996, the Court of Appeals accepted the companies’ demand. Im-
mediately, both the regulator (CNE) and the State Defense Council – which joined the
con‡ict as a consumer representative – appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision and the new regulatory tari¤s were into
e¤ect on April 28.
Extra paymentsmade in the December28, 1996to April 28, 1997period werereturned
21Both the regulator and the monopoly make their own estimation about costs of the benchmark
(e¢cient …rm) and confront them. If after negotiation there remains some discrepancy, the …nal estimated
cost of the e¢cient …rm is a weighted average of the estimates provided by the …rm and the regulator.
Then, if the …rm does not agree with the new tari¤s, it may behave opportunistically by arguing against
transparency on regulator procedures.
19to consumers. Nevertheless, extra income obtained in the November 4 to December 27,
1996 period was not returned to consumersand distribution companies realized additional
pro…ts of around $ 7 million as a result of the lawsuit.
3.5. Inadequate Allocation of Water Rights
This case highlights how the inadequate allocation of water property rights may deter
entry in the generation market. Misallocation was an unforeseen outcome of privatization
and clearly re‡ects the role of informational advantages created by inadequate regulation.
Although this is not assessed in this paper, we presume that this market design failure is
likely to negatively a¤ect the functioning of the electricity bulk market in the long run.
Water property rights are an important source of disputes for three reasons.
² Although the country runs north to south, watersheds run from east to west and
are not connected among themselves (thus making arbitration infeasible).
² Since the country is so narrow and water descends from an altitude of 12,000 feet to
sea level in less than one hundred miles, the possibilities for locating hydroelectric
generating units are limited.
² The weather tends to be erratic, creating large hydrological risks.
Consequently, water rights become crucial for the development of hydroelectric com-
panies.
Shortly before privatizing the electricity sector, the government reformed water rights
which were at the time the sole property of the State. New regulations retained the
property in the hands of the State, but established the right of private parties to request
concessions to use water for consumption and other purposes. Rights could be claimed by
any individual or …rms at no cost (except in the case of disputes, wherein the government
could auction the rights). In addition, rights do not expire and there is no penalty for
holding rights without e¤ective use.
Water rights held by Endesa at the time it was privatized were transferred to the new
proprietor. These water rights largely exceed Endesa’s investment plan; in fact, Endesa’s
water rights are such that if generating plants were built, production could increase by
3,100 MW, that is 75% of the SIC’s current capacity. In addition, it holds water rights
for another 2,000 MW in the south which could potentially be linked to the SIC at a
moderate investment cost. After privatization, Endesa claimed another 79 water rights
out of some 280 claims …led by di¤erent electric and industrial companies.
Operators in the market have expressed fears that Endesa could use water rights as
an entry deterrence mechanism for other producers. The extent to which these water
20rights can be e¤ectively used as a barrier to entry depends, as expected, on the avail-
ability of alternative sources for generating electricity. In this sense, newly built gas
pipelines that import natural gas from Argentina have certainly reduced the value of
water rights as a source of monopoly power in generation22. Nevertheless, in 1996 the
Antitrust Commission recommended not to give additional water rights to Endesa to
avoid “noncompetitive behavior.” This led to the canceling of Endesa’s Neltume project,
a $ 300 million generating plant that was to have been developed during 1996–1998.
Moreover, extensive allocation of water rights to Endesa has also had entry deterrence
e¤ects in other industries. In Aysén, a scarcely populated area in the south, Endesa
holds 30% of available water rights but does not have any facility in operation, while
the local state-owned generating plant supplies the entire current demand with less than
one percent of the area’s water rights. This situation has inhibited the development of
an aluminum plant project which requires a large amount of electricity for its operation.
Needing access to water rights, the Canadian company Noranda invited Endesa to be a
(minor) partner in the $ 3,000 million project. The project stalled when Endesa declined
the o¤er.
3.6. Institutional Weakness: The Relative Ine¢ciency of Regulators and In-
stitutions Enforcing Contracts
There are …ve institutions in chargeof regulating and monitoringthe sector(CNE, CDEC,
SEC, the Antitrust Commission, and the Ministry of the Economy). In general, these
institutions convey a sense of acting in isolation of interest groups and political parties,
which in turn implies that agents respect their decisions. Nevertheless, their limitations
in terms of human capital and resources induces severe ine¢ciency in their performance,
as well as high litigation costs and certain randomness in the decisions made. I summarize
in this section several cases of open con‡ict directly related to the Antitrust Commission,
CDEC, and CNE.
The Antitrust Commission During the past 8 years, legal demands have been very
limited and, except for three large-scale trials, most of them have been of little economic
impact. Tables N± 2 and N± 3 present a summary of trials and their corresponding
judgements. In total, 16 suits related to the electricity sector with signi…cant economic
content were initiated at both the prevention and resolution commissions. In addition,
there were 9 other cases (unreported) in which individuals sued the electricity companies
for minor issues (such as delays in connection or repair services).
22Marginal costs of gas-steam combinated-cycle plants are between of those by hidoelectric and ther-
moelectric plants during normal seasons. Thermoelectricity is the more expensive technology during
these periods.
21Table N± 2
Antitrust Commission: Proceedings of the Prevention Commission
(selected cases from 1989 to 1997)
Date of Date of Parties Involved Reason Outcomes
Proceeding Sentence
Nov-10-89 Feb-05-90 Sinel (d) against Overlap of geographic zones Overlapping is
Chilectra (d) allows predatory practices not allowed
Jun-07-90 Jan-29-92 CMET (telephones) Abuse of monopoly power CMET withdraws
against Enersis (Chilectra doesn’t pay services) accusations
Jun-27-90 Jan-27-92 Puente Alto (g) against Abuse of monopoly power Rio Maipo
Rio Maipo (d) in the devolution of payments is …ned
Dec-07-90 Nov-25-91 Rio Maipo (d) Anticompetitive practices The information was
against Puente Alto (P. Alto hides information) publicly announced
Jun-12-91 Aug-07-92 Puente Alto (g) against Abuse of monopoly power Rio Maipo
Rio Maipo (d) (R.M. requires illegal guarantees) is …ned
Dec-13-91 May-13-93 Pedro de Valdicia Abuses of monopoly power Rejected
against Litoral (d) on installation and power supply
Jul-29-93 Sep-16-93 CORFO ask advice Whether auctioning Auctioning adjust
Edelnor shares is legal to law
Oct-26-94 Oct-05-95 Pullinque (g) against Abuse of monopoly power Rejected
Endesa (g) and Chilgener (g) when …xing tari¤s
Jul-04-96 Nov-25-96 CNE ask advice Whether new water rigths given The court recommended
to Endesa a¤ect competition to avoid it
Dec-23-96 Endesa Appeals the previous sentence Rejected
Note: (d) distribution company; (g) generating company; (t) transmission company.
22Table N± 3
Antitrust Commission: Proceedings of the Resolution Commission
(selected cases from 1989 to 1997)
Date of Date of Parties Involved Reason Outcomes
Proceeding Sentence
Nov-04-88 Mar-13-90 VTR (telecom) against Endesa asks VTR for a study Rejected
Endesa (g) but awards it to a rival …rm
Feb-14-90 Mar-27-90 Chilectra Appeals sentence of the Overlapping is allowed but
Prevention Commission tari¤s must be similars
Jun-05-90 Jun-02-92 Briones (particular) against Collusion to elect directors Rejected
Enersis & several AFP
Jun-05-90 Jun-07-92 Pullinque (g) against Abuse of power market Rejected
Endesa (g) on the transmission grid
Mar-20-92 Sep-15-92 Colbún(g) against Pehuenche(g), Firms discriminate Colbún withdraws
Endesa (g) and Chilectra (d) against Colbún accusations
Sep-26-93 Briones (particular) Appeals previous sentence Rejected
Mar-22-94 Rio Maipo(g) Appeals sentence of the Rejected. Rio Maipo is …ned
Prevention Commission for abuse of power market
Oct-02-92 Jun-11-97 The Fiscal Económico against Vertical separation of Rejected
…rms of the Enersis Holding this conglomerate
Oct-10-95 Pullinque (g) against Appeals sentence of the Rejected
Endesa (g) & Transelec (t) Prevention Commission
Jan-07-97 Endesa Appeals previous sentence Rejected
Note: (d) distribution company; (g) generating company; (t) transmission company.
A second important conclusion that can be drawn from the tables is that trials tend
to be quite long. On average, trials lasted 12 months in the Prevention Commission
and 20 months in the Resolution Commission. Since most disputes go through both
commissions, on average any dispute may take around three years to reach a sentence.
Once the resolution commission issues a judgement, appeals must go to the Supreme
Court, an endeavor that could last a couple of years more. For example, the two large
scale lawsuits against Enersis holding described in section 3.1 were extremely long trials
(2 to 4 years).
To a large extent the ine¢ciency of the Antitrust Commission comes from its lack
of resources. Judges work ad-honorem, which may guarantee independence, but also
implies they have little time for these matters which, in turn, lengthens the processes.
The Commission’s technical sta¤ is poorly paid and ill suited for the job because most
23are lawyers with little training in economics, which is a common problem in developing
countries.
There are also more structural problems. First, the resolution commission (highest
in rank) consists of 5 members not necessarily trained to resolve technically complex and
economically di¢cult disputes: one Supreme court judge,23 two public o¢cer appointed
ex-o¢cio, and two university deans (one froma law school, one froman economicsschool),
who are randomly selected from all universities.24 As is apparent given its structure, the
commission rely on expert witnesses to weigh arguments, facts, and opinions. But given
its limitations in …nancial resources, good advise is certainly not guaranteed. The govern-
ment has realized these problems and increased the Commission’s budget substantially
for 1998.
Second, the legal systemin Chile isvery antiquated, based largely on “tangible” proofs
of misbehavior and not amiable to acting on the grounds of reasonable presumptions. In
fact, illegal practices must be speci…ed in advance (typi…ed). Moreover, the commission,
being a public-law bounded unit, is only allowed to do things (instead of limited to
do things, as is the case of the private sector). This limits the range of actions of the
commission, both in areas of interests and in the type of proofs that are required to
sanction non competitive practices. To some extent, this legal structure reproduces the
spirit of the Chilean legal system which was designed in a way such that discretion in
the public sector is rarely found (Napoleon’s Code).
An early paper by Paredes (1988) analyzes the sentences given out by the Antitrust
Commission since its inception in 1974. He found a relatively higher pursuit and sanction-
ing of vertical integration practices in oligopolistic markets, which are, however, largely
justi…ed in the literature as welfare improving (Tirole, 1988, chapter 4). The reasons for
this inadequate behavior is to be found, according to Paredes, in two elements: the lack
of clear de…nition of the purposes of antitrust regulation (which blurs the judgment) and
the fact that practices that can be easily speci…ed mostly correspond to mergers.
Third, …nes are very low when compared to the potential bene…ts of malpractice,
hampering the credibility of regulators. Fines levied by the Antitrust Commission in
the 1975-1987 period amounted on average to $ 29,000, an the maximum …ne was $
147,000. For example, on May 1, 1997 a system failure left the 80% of the country
without electric power for 55 minutes. The largest …ve generating companies and the
transmitter Transelec were …ned after an investigation proved that their response to the
emergency was excessively slow due to cost considerations (the expected delay is around
3 minutes). The investigation concluded that the main reason was that since support
23Judges in Chile have no formal training in economics whatsoever.
24When the Antitrust Commission was formed in the mid-70s there were 7 to 10 high quality schools
of law and departments of economics in the country, usually with highly trained personnel. This made
the “academic” part of the commission trustworthy. However, later the government deregulated higher
education markets. To date, there are over 70 schools of law and economics, whose quality is very varied.
24units have a higher operating cost than a failing unit, the CDEC did not respond as fast
as expected. Although maximum …nes were applied, these were minimal in comparison
with average sales or assets of these six companies: each company was …ned less than $
35,000.25
Limitations of the CDEC in Self-Monitoring Asmentioned, disputes in the CDEC
have been very limited. An indirect way to assess the lack of disputes regarding the
working of the CDEC – on determining the short-run marginal cost and the allocation of
demand among di¤erent producers – is by recognizing that many of these were muted, for
example, when there is dissent by one or more members of the CDEC from the majority
decision. Since CDEC’s inception, the number of dissensions has remained rather low,
as shown in Figure 3.1.









Although the number is very small, the trend is somewhat alarming. It may re‡ect
several aspects of the evolution of the industry.
² As more operators enter the market (for example, through changes in ownership)
they are challenging Enersis’ dominant role.26
25In May, 1999 the Congress pass a new law that increases maximum …nes to $ 6 million. This changes
was gathered by 4 weeks of continuous black-outs during April, 1999.
26Foreign investors have recently become to play an important role in the sector, as has been the case
25² Dissensions have been used as a negotiation tool in disputes in other areas not
necessarily linked to the electricity sector.
² The 1996–1997 hydrological year (May to April) was characterized by a severe
drought and, for the …rst time in years, some rationing was considered (it was not
adopted, though voltage was reduced by 5%). In these conditions, the CDEC was
operating close to the point of “technical failure”, a condition at which generators
could be …ned, thus exacerbating disputes.27
The case of Chilgener accusing Endesa of abuse of power in the dispatch of gener-
ating plants during the last months of 1997 exempli…es a con‡ict within CDEC that
went beyond standard procedures. Instead of taking its complaint to the Minister of
the Economy, Chilgener went directly to the Antitrust Commission. This decision may
re‡ect that Chilgener considered the issue beyond the boundaries of a standard CDEC
con‡ict because the accusation dealt with intentional wrongdoing not a simple techni-
cal discrepancy. This lawsuit shows clearly that con‡ict within the CDEC has not only
increased in frequency but also in virulence.
Chilgener’s allegation was that, invoking security reasons, Endesa had forced the
CDEC to allocate less energy than its capacity would allow to a crucial segment of the
northern SIC. In this segment Endesa has no operations, so that Chilgener’s ancillary
Guacolda had to supply energy to cover the gap. Since Guacolda is a thermoelectric
producer, at that particular time it would have been to its advantage to purchase energy
in the spot market at marginal cost instead of producing it. Chilgener estimated the
losses in the four months at $ 17 million.
The initial response of Endesa was to renounce its role as coordinator of energy
dispatch in the CDEC, in retaliation to the lawsuit. Nevertheless, Chilgener and Enersis
reached an out of court settlement and the lawsuit was dropped. The terms of the
agreement are not public but it takes into consideration that Endesa may assume the
economic cost incurred by Guacolda.
Weaknesses in the Management of the CNE The CNE, the agency in charge of
de…ning the sector’s policies and calculating tari¤s and prices, has played a crucial role in
disputes in the electricity sector in Chile. It has been unable to issue the Statute of the
Electricity Sector during the last eight years, despite the fact that an advanced draft was
ready in 1992, creating major problems in the sector. Transmission tolls and investment
charges are among the key issues that the statute should address.
of Endesa of Spain and its successful hostile take-over on Enersis (August, 1997 and February, 1999) and
Endesa (May, 1999)
27The most severe drought of the century is happening in 1999. There are a big number of con‡ict
among generating plants, distributors, large (free) customers, the antitrust commission, and the CNE
because of systematic system failures in the SIC (black-outs) during April and May.
26This delay is somewhat surprising, to the point that one is tempted to conclude that it
is in the government’s advantage not to issue the statute. However, the statute is likely to
be technically complex, in particular when considering network expansions. Calculating
prorate under asymmetric (and largely unobservable) information is very di¢cult. It is
also possible that the statute will a¤ect large players in the market in di¤erent ways,
leading to political di¢culties as a result. The two main holdings in the electricity
sector (Enersis and Chilgener) have interest in several other areas of the economy and
in other countries in Latin America, and are thus important political agents. Second,
private sector executives consider the CNE to be politically weak to make sharp and
quick decisions.
4. Analysis
From the point of view of supporting the actions of policy makers dealing with privatiza-
tion and regulated markets, it is interesting to derive the main conclusions of the Chilean
experience in the decade after privatization. When analyzing from the broad perspective
the six cases of open con‡ict described in detail in the previous section, the main lesson
can be grouped into two areas which are discussed below.
4.1. Why Disputing ?
Con‡ict, as expected, has concentrated in those areas in which regulation is incomplete,
information asymmetry is high, and institutions are less able to control private sector
activities and enforce contracts (Williamson, 1985).
The Chilean regulation is, in speci…c but important areas, still incomplete and im-
perfect. The di¤erent cases revised in this paper suggest that con‡ict has concentrated
on problems arising from the existence of conglomerates (vertical integration), the non-
de…nition of certain areas in regulation (transmission tolls and investment cost-sharing
appear), and the opportunistic behavior of agents due to institutional weaknesses.
Vertical Integration and Ine¢cient Allocation of Resources One of the main
problems of theChilean privatization ofthe electricity sectoristhat it allowed thecreation
of a large vertically-integrated conglomerate (Enersis), that can use its market power in
regulated segments of the market in order to reduce competition and obtain extra pro…ts
in competitive segments. This dominant position would not be of capital importance if
information problems were irrelevant or if there was a very e¤ective system of antitrust
law, but since in the electricity sector asymmetric information and incomplete contracts
are important, vertical and horizontal integration does matter.
Under symmetric information, vertical integration could be consistent with e¢ciency
gains. In fact, in this case a monopoly does not need to integrate downstream to ob-
27tain monopoly pro…ts; it is su¢cient to use nonlinear pricing mechanisms (Tirole, 1988,
Chapter 4). The above analysis of the Chilean experience suggests that e¢ciency gains
are eclipsed, however, when information problems are important and the country cannot
rely on institutions to enforce an adequate regulation, the judiciary system is unable to
resolve disputes at a reasonable cost or it randomly interpretes and incomplete contract,
and players lack long-term commitment. All these problems – which should have been
considered at the moment of designing the privatization process in Chile – have been
responsible for much of the litigation observed in the 1990-1997 period.
The Chilean case also shows that once property rights have been allocated to the
monopoly in the privatization process, they become very di¢cult to eliminate. In turn,
this implies that the monopoly will spend resources trying to avoid further modi…cation
to regulation of property rights (lobby). A clear example is that when sued for vertical
integration, Enersis hired a large group of experts in electricity and industrial organiza-
tion, virtually cornering the market (section 3.1). In addition, when regulation is not
optimal, property rights can sometimes be used as legal entry barriers, as is the case of
water rights described in section 3.5.
The experiences I studied suggest that under informational asymmetries, there exists
elusive ways to bypass the antitrust law, which are very di¢cult to prove in court. As
discussed in previous sections, operating within the limits of the law, the monopoly may
behave strategically in order to predate the market. Another example of the importance
of entry barriers against competitors occurs because the regulator is unable to monitor
network connections. Even a well prepared regulator cannot elicit true information when
informational asymmetries are important and investment is required to provide services
to competitors, as discussed in the case of con‡ict when requiring the expansion of the
electricity transmission network (section 3.3).28
A …nal example of non-improving welfare consequences of vertical integration stem-
ming from the Chilean experience occurs when the monopolist uses its joint ownership in
upstream and downstream …rms in order to increase its rents (as a conglomerate) beyond
the limits allowed by regulation. In the electricity case, this happened when the monop-
olist in distribution used its market power to allocate purchases of electricity along the
year such that it purchased from its related …rm in periods with low operating costs and
bought from its competitors when costs were high, as addressed in the discrimination
case against Colbún presented in section 3.2.
28See La¤ont and Tirole (1993), chapters 5, 9, and 10 for a theoretical treatment. Under static
regulation, the explanation is that regulator has fewer instruments than those required to elicit unknown
parameters (network expansion). Therefore, the monopolist may use this advantage in order to extract
rents from competitors. This argument would be suitable to the Chilean electricity sector. Another
explanation, certainly suitable to any developing country, is that in a dynamic setting the regulator may
have no commitment, then ratchet e¤ect applies.
28Ambiguities in the Regulatory Framework and Incomplete Contracts The
Chilean experience in the recently privatized electricity sector shows the importance of
designing an adequate regulatory framework to avoid post-contractual con‡icts. The lack
of awareness of the possible future states of the world raised contracts incompleteness and
induces opportunistic behavior in the market. Incomplete contracts do not specify nor
make clearimportant aspects of the economic life of …rmsin the market, not only a¤ecting
to the natural monopoly but also a¤ecting competitors in related markets because of
the existence of conglomerates. In Chile, ambiguity in the regulatory framework made
possible that …rms with a dominant position behave opportunistically in order to extract
rents from consumers and other …rms in potential competitive markets, as it has been
seen in the indetermination of transmission tolls case (section 3.3) and the tari¤ setting
case (section 3.4).
Privatization in Chile was initiated before completing the regulatory framework. Such
a sequencing of policy is extremely dangerous in sectors with substantial informational
asymmetries because, once in place, the monopolist will be negatively a¤ected with ex-
post revisions of the regulatory body. Obviously, the monopolist has invested in rent
seeking activities, capture, and in‡uences in order to impede expropriations of its rights,
even though those revisions are welfare improvements from the society perspective.
In addition, uncertainty regarding property rights hampers the quality of the entre-
preneurial class entering in the sector. Ambiguities in the regulatory framework makes
investment more risky, so attracting more risk averse entrepreneurs and/or those with
more lobby capabilities. Furthermore, when the government is unable to credible commit
to policies in the long run, …rms rationally expect opportunistic behavior from the au-
thority. Theoretically, the hold-up e¤ect occurs (Hart and Moore, 1988, and Williamson,
1985) and the country cannot undertake necessary investments in the sector in order to
induce an optimal rate of long-run growth. This may be an explanation to both the small
amount of investments in transmission lines and the failed attempt to de-concentrate the
transmission segment in 1995.
Institutional Weaknesses and Disputes Chile’s experience shows the importance
of institutions in reducing the adverse e¤ects of ambiguities in regulation and vertical in-
tegration in regulated markets. As argued by the mechanism-design theory, transactions
costs and incomplete contracts would be irrelevant if a country has prepared institutions
to design and enforce more complex contracts (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1994,
and Maskin and Tirole, 1997). Nevertheless, in Chile there are several limitations (hu-
man capital, legal frameworks, …nancial resources) which impede governments to write
complex and enforceable contracts, as suggested in the implementation literature.
The Chilean case shows that disputes in highly developed industries, as the electricity
sector, are often of an extremely technical nature, which requires an independent and
29well-trained judiciary system to resolve disputes at reasonable costs. Otherwise, the
possibility of opportunistic behavior – as was apparent in the tari¤ setting case discussed
in section 3.4 – will induce allocative ine¢ciency in the case that the judiciary system
cannot adequately interpret legal loopholes. In addition, since the country lacks educated
and independent judges, then there is space for the dominant …rm (or conglomerate) to
use its market power against competitors in potentially competitive markets. That seems
to be the case in several con‡icts in which Enersis has been involved.
When the judiciary system is unable to provide quick and fair treatment to disputes,
it is in the advantage of both parties to use the services of an independent referee, which
the parties have previously agreed upon. The main drawback of referees is that they
lack the power to enforce actions or sanctions emanating from their referral. In Chile,
referees have played an important role, as described in several cases in section 3, but their
inability in issuing mandatory sentences limit their impact and have led the government
to suggest the legal creation of refereeing commissions with sanctioning power.29
E¢cient privatization also requires educated and independent regulators to properly
design complex contracts, minimize non-covered contingencies, and help the government
to work out laws and statutes to improve e¢ciency in the sector. An endemic problem of
regulatory agencies in Chile is the lack of a trained sta¤ to deal with their private sector
counterparts. It a¤ects, for instance, the relative power of the government at the moment
of renegotiating regulated tari¤s. Another example stems from the vertical integration
case in section 3.1, where the Fiscal Económico lacked a consistent set of arguments to
convince judges that presumptions in cases of regulation can be as important as tangible
evidence.
4.2. Why Public Disputes might be Inhibited ?
Despite the open con‡ict cases described above, ten years of post-privatization experience
shows that the number of publicly known disputes in the electricity sector is reduced.
From the analysis of some of those cases, the explanation is threefold.
First, to a large extent, low con‡ict is the result of a regulatory design which, in broad
lines, is well conceived. Regulation presents features which ensure monitoringand control,
guarantees access to information, and provide an harmonic interaction among private
agents and with regulators. Amongthese features, we may note the clear separation of the
di¤erent stages of production, clear regulatory principles in each stage, con‡ict resolution
mechanismsproperly designed, lack of political interference, and a privatization processin
which …rms presented a sound …nancial stance. The law provides several mechanisms and
institutions that smooth the working of the market; in particular, it considers institutions
designed to coordinate daily operations in an e¢cient manner and guarantee the quality
29Enforceability of referees’ decisions is one of the novelties features of the newly Chilean Highway
Franchising process. See Saavedra and Soto (1999) for further details.
30of service. In turn, these elements reduce opportunistic behavior and rent-seeking, thus
limiting disputes and con‡icts. In my opinion, these set of elements comprise a setup
that has played the important role of signalling …rms the market structure that should
be achieved in the long run.
A second explanation of the limited number of legal disputes is the weakness of the
Chilean judiciary system. It presents technical and legal limitations which make litigation
costly, slow and unpredictable in its decisions. Thus, as predicted by the theory, private
parties solve their disputes in pretrial settlements.
As discussed in section 3.6, Chilean judges do not specialize in economic matters.
Judges acquire formal education only in law; training in economics is informal and,
undoubtedly, limited. In addition, it is acknowledged that the legal apparatus in Chile is
very ine¢cient not only in terms of the speed a which cases are processed but also because
of its tendency to rely on “tangible” proofs of misbehavior. In cases of non-competitive
behavior, physical evidence is very di¢cult to obtain (in cases of predation it is actually
impossible to obtain). Ine¢ciency, on the other hand, induces high litigation costs.
In addition to the lack of training of the judiciary system, the poor conformation of
the judges within the Antitrust Commission make sentence di¢cult to predict. As shown
in several cases of section 3, sentences have changed dramatically as cases progress in the
judiciary system. In turn, this makes legal con‡icts risky in terms of results.
Hence, the private sector has incentives to engage in referrals with agreed-upon ref-
erees to avoid legal disputes. In fact, the 1982 Electricity Law proposes a number of
situation in which parties should seek arbitration. In most cases analyzed in this paper,
referees have played an important role in solving disputes, and even proposing mecha-
nisms to amend regulation loopholes (e.g. suggesting transmission tolls and investment
prorates). This mechanism is not su¢cient to resolve con‡icts, however, because deci-
sions made by referees are not de…nite and can be appealed through to the judiciary
system.
Third, the relative absence of litigation could also be the result of strategic actions by
di¤erent players in the market. It has been argued elsewhere that the electricity sector
could actually be a duopoly, in which not only tacit collusion is likely, but also …rms
share a conduct code which force them to maintain a low public pro…le for disputes.
The larger holdings (Enersis and Chilgener) would prefer a low pro…le for its disputes
because a well publicized case could hamper their public image or, more troublesome,
could induce intervention by the authorities.
An indirect evidence of this “velvet-glove” strategy is that, despite being a¤ected by
Enersis misconducts, Chilgener has rarely engaged in open disputes with Enersis and
has never participated in the vertical integration trials as part or witness. In fact, the
main dispute among them, regarding abuse of power in the CDEC (described in section
3.6), was rapidly settled using a referee and avoiding open litigation. On the other hand,
small …rms could feel intimidated by the large size of major players and …nd it safer to
31maintain a non-aggressive stance.
Although the above considerations could explain the low frequency of litigation among
…rms of the private sector, the public sector does not face the same incentives and con-
straints. One possible explanation is the scarcity of well trained personnel in the gov-
ernment. The fragility of the public sector’s human capital in Chile is largely due to the
insu¢ciency of resources and low wages, which makes pro…table for an individual to ob-
tain experience in the regulatory agency and then to move to some …rm in the regulated
industry with higher income, leaving less quali…ed and dynamic personnel in the public
sector. In addition, this situation has the perverse that regulators expecting to obtain a
position in regulated …rms will not make decisions that would negatively a¤ect potential
employers, even if such decisions are welfare improving.
Finally, another possible explanation of the passivity of the public sector is that
con‡ict is minimized because regulatory agencies are not willing to pay the political cost
of engaging in reforms that would alter status-quo and pro…tability of some …rms in the
industry. An element that would support this conjecture is the fact that the government
has not issued the statute of the sector since the law was passed in 1990, despite being
mandatory.
5. Conclusions
Public disputes in the newly privatized Chilean electricity sector provide us with a useful
analysis of the causes of such con‡icts. The main lessons of our …ndings, from the policy
maker’s perspective, is that even though the Chilean experience shows a low level of open
con‡ict, there is a large number of loopholes in the regulatory framework and important
institutional capability constraints. The economic consequences of these problems on the
competitiveness of the electricity industry are exacerbated by the existence of a conglom-
erate operating in all segments of the market. Certainly these problems, if extended to
other public service industries, may inhibit a greater long-run growth of the economy.
The main conclusion of this paper is, therefore, the timing of privatization does mat-
ter. It is better – before privatizing – to strengthen capabilities of both regulatory and
judiciary institutions, create an adequate regulatory framework, and properly design the
structure of the market. The Chilean experience shows that it is extremely costly to
incorporate main changes in market structure or even to enact regulatory reforms once
property rights have been allocated to private parties.
Policy makers have, therefore, a number of yet-to-be-performed duties in Chile, not
only at the level of the regulatory institutions related to the electricity sector but also
for the central government in re-thinking major reforms in both regulatory institutional
setup and the whole judiciary system.
A summary of our main …ndings is:
32² Con‡ict, as predicted by the theory, has concentrated in those areas in which regu-
lation is incomplete, information asymmetry is high, and institutions are less able
to control private sector activities.
² Vertical and horizontal integration does matter when these informational and con-
tracting problems are present. Hence, the importance of revising the market struc-
ture in the electric industry should be assessed in terms of the relative advantages
of di¤erent feasible institutional arrangements, such as the existence of vertically
related conglomerates, vertical separation, divestiture of the monopolistic trans-
mitter, and so on.30
² There has been a reduced number of open and important disputes since the Chilean
electricity sector was privatized in the late 80’s. Such a fact may be explained by:
– The regulatory design is, in broad terms, well conceived. Regulation presents
features which ensure monitoring and control, guarantees access to informa-
tion, and provides an harmonic interaction among private agents and the reg-
ulators.
– The judiciary system presents technical and legal limitations which make lit-
igation costly, slow, and unpredictable in its decisions. Then, a strategic
response from agents (monopolies, competitor …rms, or government) to insti-
tutional weaknesses in the country is to avoid open con‡ict.
– Major players in the electricity sector may have a tacit agreement to not make
public their disagreements.
– Private …rms capture regulatory institutions to maintain the status-quo.
These lessons are likely to be applicable to other naturally monopolistic markets in
Chile whose privatization processes were done under the same liberal perspective; for
example, telecommunications. Privatization and regulation of gas, water and sewage,
and transportation has been partially implemented in Chile during the 90’s considering
further informational, transactional, and institutional constrains. Nevertheless, recent
research (Basañes, Saavedra and Soto, 1999) shows that there are important components
of learning-by-doing in the process of incorporating the private sector to traditional state-
own activities.
Whether or not the Chilean experience is suitable to other countries is an open ques-
tion. That is because, in practice, the degree of contract incompleteness depends on spe-
ci…c country characteristics (such as corruption, the legal framework, and the strength
30Saavedra (1999) presents a theoretical assessment in this regard.
33of institutions) and on the particulars of the industry under analysis. Hence, our conclu-
sions are better suited to others utility sectors and developing countries sharing similar
characteristics to that of the sector analyzed here.
In the early 90’s, privatization processes exploded around the world. Most priva-
tizations in Eastern Europe – and other countries with former socialist governments –
were undertaken in potentially competitive industries, so that our analysis is not ap-
plicable to those cases. On the other hand, several Latin American countries initiated a
rapid process of privatization of natural monopoly industries in early 90’s. Most of these
country general characteristics are similar to Chile’s, so that their governments took the
Chilean privatization process as an example and many of them undertook deeper re-
forms than Chile’s. A large number of post-privatization renegotiations and disputes in
those countries have been recently reported (Artana, Navajas, and Urbiztondo, 1998, and
Basañes, Uribe, and Willig, 1998). Such …ndings are consistent with ours, in the sense
that, the faster and deeper the privatization processes (so, greater loopholes in reforms),
the more con‡icts there are likely to be in equilibrium.
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